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Professor of Law, University of Maryland, and Special Counsel, Federal Trade
Commission. No one who reviewed this article in advance of publication wished to have that
fact known. Even more than usual, none of the opinions expressed in this Article should be
imputed to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or to any of its Commissioners. This article is
dedicated to Nancy Sprague, who taught me how to write. Learning how to write satire and
gothic horror (and this article qualifies as both) was just a bonus.
1. JUVENAL (DECIMUS JUNIUs JUVENALIS), SATREs (l, 29) (110-130 A.D.) ("It is hard not
to write satire.").
Several works inspired this Article. See generally STEPHEN VINCENT BENET, THE DEVIL
AND DANIEL WEBSTER (1937); C.S. LEWIS, Ti SCREWTAPE LETTERS (Harper San Francisco
2001) (1942); MARK TWAIN, A CONNECTICUT YANKEE IN KINO ARTHUR'S COURT (Oxford
University Press 1996) (1889); Uwe Reinhardt, The PredictableManaged CareKvetch on the

Rocky Roadfrom Adolescence to Adulthood, 24 J.HEALTH, POL., POL'Y & L. 897 (1999); Todd
J.Zywicki, With Apologies to Screwtape: A Response to ProfessorAlexander,9 J.BANKR. L. &

PRAc. 613 (2000).
However, the "seed-crystal" that precipitated what follows was an off-hand remark by
Professor Uwe Reinhardt that the Devil must have designed our health insurance system. See
Interview by Public Broadcasting System with Uwe E. Reinhardt, Professor of Health
Economics, Princeton University, at http://www.pbs.org/healthcarecrisis/experts.htm (last
visited Jan. 21, 2004) (suggesting that "the Devil systematically built our health insurance

system [which] has the feature that when you're down on your luck, you're unemployed, you
lose your insurance ... only the Devil could ever have invented such a system. Humans of
goodwill would never do this.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Professor
Reinhardt failed to consider that the Devil might have a diversified portfolio of projects and
would not limit his efforts to the employment-based health insurance system.
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I. Introduction
Medicare is the 800 pound gorilla of American health policy. Covering
approximately forty million (primarily elderly) Americans, it funnels $250
billion per year into the pockets of physicians, hospitals, clinical laboratories,
home health agencies, physical therapists, social workers, and a veritable army
of other health professionals. Medicare's administered pricing system can,
whether by accident or design, shower largesse on particular regions, provider
groups, and device manufacturers while starving others-with predictable
consequences on the availability of the underlying goods and services.
Medicare's footprint is so large that its every move has spill-over effects on the
rest of the market.
Given Medicare's centrality to health care and health policy, it is not
surprising that it has attracted considerable academic attention. Amazon.com
lists more than 800 books that mention Medicare.2 Every year, approximately
500 law review articles are published that mention Medicare-100 in the title.3
The participants in this symposium account for numerous books and scores of
articles on the subject.
Although I have written articles on fraud and'abuse, patient dumping, and
the quality of care received by Medicare beneficiaries, I am a comparative
newcomer to the subject of Medicare. 4 When I start working on an article, my
2. A web search on September 11, 2003 revealed 869 books that mention Medicare.
http://www.amazon.com (last visited Sept. 11, 2003).
3. As of September I1, 2003, 369 law review articles mentioning Medicare had been
published in 2003. http://www.westlaw.com (last visited Sept., 11, 2003).
4. See generally David A. Hyman, Does MedicareCareAbout Quality?, 46 PERSP. Bio.
& MED. 55 (2003) [hereinafter Hyman, Does Medicare Care About Quality?]; David A. Hyman,
Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Market Change, Social Norms, and "the Trust Reposed in the
Workmen", 30 J. LEGAL STUDIES 531 (2001) [hereinafter Hyman, Market Change]; David A.
Hyman, HIPAA and Health Care Fraud: An Empirical Perspective, 22 CATO J. 151 (2002)
[hereinafter Hyman, HIPAA]; David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Just What the Patient
Ordered: The Case For Result-Based Compensation in Health Care, 29 J. L. MED. & EMruCS
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invariant strategy is to obtain and read as many prior writings on the subject as I
can locate. In short order, stacks of books and articles on Medicare soon filled
my office. After considerable research and many late nights, I completed an
article for this Symposium. My article analyzed the Medicare program from a
competition policy perspective, identified a few minor problems for correction,
and lauded the contributions of Medicare to health policy and social justice.5
The article then waxed wroth about the vicious lies and calumny told about
Medicare by its detractors.6
Word apparently got out that I was working on an article about Medicare.
A mysterious document appeared in my inbox at the University of Maryland
School of Law shortly before the conference. My secretary informed me that a
courier clothed in black and red, driving a red Lamborghini Diablo, delivered
the document.' The mailer bears an official-looking sticker, warning those who
handle it that the envelope is made with asbestos fibers. The mailer bears an
extraordinary amount of stamps, each bearing the likeness of Rodin's Gates of
Hell.8 The document within the mailer is written on black parchment, reeks of
brimstone, and singes the fingers of those unwary enough to handle it without
insulated gloves. The words on each page glow red against the black
parchment. The cover of the document is stamped with the legend, "Abandon
170 (2001); David A. Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, and Narrative, 73 IND. L. J. 797 (1998);
David A. Hyman, Patient Dumping and EMTALA: Past Imperfect/FutureShock, 8 HEALTH
MATRIX 29 (1998) [hereinafter Hyman, Past Imperfect/Future Shock]; David A. Hyman &
Charles Silver, You Get What You Pay For: Result-Based Compensationfor Health Care, 58
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1427 (2001) [hereinafter Hyman &Silver, You Get What You PayFor].

5. Of course, I found some things to kibitz about. I am a law professor after all. But, it
was a major struggle to identify flaws with Medicare, let alone to generate the enthusiasm to
propose doing something about them. (If you believe that, then I know some nice people at the
FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection who would like to talk with you about how you really,
really should not be trusted with cash or credit cards, let alone be allowed to answer e-mails
from bankers who worked for deposed dictators in Africa. Or did you already fall for one of
those cons?) See U.S. SECRET SERVICE, PUBLIC AWARENESS ADVISORY REGARDING "4-1-9" OR
"ADVANCE FEE FRAUD" SCHEMES, at http://www.secretservice.gov/advisories.shtm (last visited
Jan. 21, 2003) (warning the public about Advance Fee Fraud schemes) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. On the dangers of waxing wroth, cf HORSEFEATHERS (Paramount Pictures 1932):

Secretary: Sir, the Dean is waxing wroth.
Groucho: Well, tell the dean to stop waxing wroth, and let Roth go and wax the
Dean for a while.
7. In an extraordinary noncoincidence, this was the exact make and model as the car
driven by Elizabeth Hurley in Bedazzled. See BEDAZZLED (Twentieth Century Fox 2000)
(depicting Elizabeth Hurley as the Devil driving a red Lamborghini Diablo with a black leather
interior).
8. AUGUSTE RODIN, THE GATES OF HELL, Musee Rodin: Paris, France (1880-1917),
available at http://musee-rodin.fr/senfl-e.htm.

1168

60 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1165 (2003)

Hope All Ye Who Read Further," and a reproduction of Hieronymus Bosch's
infamous painting of the seven deadly sins. 9 The document purports to be a
memo from a junior bureaucrat (Underling Demon 666, Deputy Assistant

Special Coordinator for Accelerating Recruitment (DASCAR) in the
Department of Illness and Satanic Services (DISS)) to the chief executive of his
organization (Satan) reporting on the progress of their plans to use Medicare to
undermine the American republic.
After reading the document, I immediately forwarded a copy to the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).' 0 I am told that they have
"top men" studying the document. " CMS was unable to provide any indication
of when or whether they would officially release the document, let alone their
analysis-although one anonymous source suggested that it2 would not take any
longer than the finalization of the EMTALA regulations.
9. HIERONYMOUS BoscH, TABLETOP OF THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS AND THE FOUR LAST
THNGS, Museo del Prado: Madrid, Spain (1485), available at http://www.abcgallery.com/b/
bosch/bosch 16.html.
10. No one has been able to explain why the acronym is not CMMS. Perhaps CMMS was
less euphonious than CMS? See Amy Goldstein, Health Insurance Agency Gets New Name;
Structure, WASH. POST, June 15, 2001, at A31 ("In keeping with the agency's new, consumerfriendly ethos, however, HHS spokesman Tony Jewell said, 'they are dropping the second M to
help your tongue get around it a little better.'"). Or perhaps the administrators didn't want to
advertise their involvement with one of the two "M"s-only one guess as to which one it was.
Alternatively, maybe program administrators were reluctant to introduce themselves as working
for a program whose acronym sounded like a (routinely overcooked) dish made of stewed
vegetables familiar to Jews of Eastern European extraction? Of course, since the early favorite
to replace the old name (Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)) was Medicare and
Medicaid Agency, we should all be appreciative that we did not end up with MAMA running
Medicare. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (outlining the concern with avoiding
maternalistic references in the agency's acronym).
11. See RAIDERS OF THE LOST ARK (Paramount Pictures 1981):
Bureaucrat: Well gentlemen, I guess that just about wraps it up.
Marcus Brody: Where is the Ark?
Bureaucrat: I thought we settled this. The Ark is somewhere very safe.
Indiana Jones: From who?
Marcus Brody: The Ark is a source of unspeakable power and it has to be
researched.
Bureaucrat: And it will be. I assure you Dr. Brody, Dr. Jones. We have top men
working on it right now.
Indiana Jones: Who?
Bureaucrat: Top... Men.
12. EMTALA is the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, which requires
hospitals that have an emergency department and accept Medicare funding to examine and treat
all comers with emergency medical conditions, regardless of their ability to pay. Health
Insurance for Aged and Disabled Part D, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2000). EMTALA took effect
on August 1, 1986 as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act. CMS
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The document was clearly important and deserved circulation to as wide
an audience as possible-if only to alert the public of the depths to which
opponents of Medicare would stoop to slime this sacred pillar of
intergenerational equity.' 3 I was faced with a wrenching decision. Do I submit
my own article, providing yet another valentine to the virtues of Medicare,
allowing me to take my rightful place at the head of the crowd of the program's
adoring academic enthusiasts? 4 Or, do I submit the demonic words
(appropriately disclaimed, of course) to alert the populace of the crafty
scheming by the insidious reactionary forces that oppose truth, justice, and the
American way-all of which are exemplified in that pillar of the Great Society,
Medicare?
Despite considerable misgivings, I ultimately decided to scrap my own
article and submit the document I received in the mail for publication in its
place. I hope readers will not judge me too harshly for passing on the
opportunity to declaim the depths of my unceasing admiration for those who
bequeathed us the Medicare program, those who legislatively tinker with it
every year or two, those who do their best to administer it and those who view
their role in life as worshipping its every feature. I particularly regret the fact
that this submission will forever disqualify me from taking my rightful place in
the forefront of the legions of Medicare's academic enthusiasts, as I fear this
group will conclude that the observations contained herein are my own and not
those of the prince of darkness and his minions. 5
issued the proposed regulations in 1988 and the final regulations in 1994. You do the math.
But see Hyman, Past Imperfect/Future Shock, supra note 4, at 29 n. I (expressing skepticism

about the ability of lawyers to do basic addition and subtraction). The best explanation for this
failing (along with the dearth of empirical legal scholarship more generally) is the fact that most
law professors had higher SAT verbal scores than math scores.
13. Inside the Washington Beltway, negative "sliming" has been raised to an art form.
But see GHOSTBUSTERs 2 (Columbia Pictures 1989) (documenting existence of positive slime).
14. There is absolutely no truth to the rumors that the working title of my original article
was "Medicare: The Triumph of Hope over Experience," let alone "Medicare, Schmedicare:
The Politics of Medicare Deification."
15. To be sure, some of my colleagues in health law already have their doubts about me.
See David A. Hyman, Medicine in the New Millennium: A Self-Help Guide for the Perplexed,

26 AM. J.L. & MED. 143, 152 (2000) (noting that my scholarly work was described at a
conference as "the sort of views that caused the Irish potato famine"). Admittedly, even if I
submitted the original article, it would probably have been difficult to elbow my way to the
forefront of Medicare's academic enthusiasts, if only because there are so many of them, each
striving for greater ideological purity than the next on the subject of Medicare. This dynamic
predictably leads to group polarization, as the echo-chamber of cross-citation and crossadulation seduces those involved into taking more and more extreme positions on the
(supposedly self-evident) virtues of Medicare. At least that's my behavioral economic
explanation for the current state of academic discourse on Medicare and I'm sticking to it. See
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE,

The Adventure of the Beryl Coronet, in THE

COMPLETE SHERLOCK
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Readers can judge for themselves the bona fides of the document, which is
reproduced in its entirety below, and the merits of the observations contained
therein. As for an appropriate disclaimer to the document itself, it is hard to
improve on Mark Twain:
Persons attempting to find a motive in this narrative will be prosecuted;
persons attempting to find a moral in it will be banished; persons
attempting to find a plot in it will be shot. 16

MEMORANDUM
ABANDON HOPE ALL YE WHO READ FURTHER
To:

His Most Exalted Satanic Majesty
Lucifer, the Prince of Darkness
King of the Damned
Beelzebub
His Nibs
Master of the Nether Regions
Scourge of the Self-Righteous (that is, Politicians and
Academics)
7th Circle of Hell
Hell

From:

Underling Demon 666
Deputy Assistant Special Coordinator for Accelerating
Recruitment (DASCAR)
Department of Illness and Satanic Services (DISS)
North American Division
Washington, D.C.

Re:

Market Share Report-United States of America

301, 315 (Doubleday 1905) (1893) ("It is an old maxim of mine that when you have
excluded the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.").
16. MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN Introductory Page (Harper &
Bros. 1901) (1884).
HOLMES
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Per your request, I report herein on behalf of DISS on the progress of our
attempts to corrupt the American republic. Happily, our market share in the
United States grows with every passing day. Our growth has been particularly
precipitous since we repackaged our product in 1965.
As you know, the recipe we have used for centuries (avarice, gluttony,
envy, sloth, lust, anger and vanity-known collectively hereafter as the "Seven7
Deadly Sins") has worked perfectly well in most of the known world.'
Unfortunately, Americans have proved curiously resistant to the charms of the
Seven Deadly Sins, even though your status as an American citizen should have
been quite helpful in this regard. 8 Through almost two centuries, Americans
persisted in doing unto others as they would have done unto themselves,
working hard and playing by the rules, staying in school, saving for a rainy day,
going to church, donating to charities, volunteering their time to worthy causes,
and generally behaving like goody-two-shoes at every conceivable occasion.
Although we have long had considerable success with our recruiting efforts
among some groups of Americans (that is, members of Congress and lawyers),
these groups were unable to do serious damage as long as the rest of the
population behaved themselves. 9
17. We have had considerable success in corrupting the virtues of most countries. I will
not address our worldwide market share except to note that our results have been particularly
satisfactory in France. On the other hand, how much credit can we take for a good catch when
the fish enthusiastically jump into the boat?
18. 1 refer your majesty to the unfortunate incident with Daniel Webster in New
Hampshire:
"Foreign?" said the stranger. "And who calls me a foreigner?"
"Well, I never yet heard of the dev-- of your claiming American citizenship," said
Dan'l Webster with surprise.
"And who with better right?" said the stranger, with one of his terrible smiles.
"When the first wrong was done to the first Indian, I was there. When the first
slaver put out for the Congo, I stood on her deck. Am I not in your books and
stories and beliefs, from the first settlements on? Am I not spoken of, still, inevery
church in New England? 'Tis true the North claims me for a Southerner, and the
South for a Northerner, but I am neither. I am ... an ... American."'
BENET, supra note 1, at 173.

19. Indeed, our success with these groups is so well known that jokes to that effect are
abundant. For example, there was the time your eminence approached a lawyer to discuss our
most common business transaction:
Devil: I can promise you extraordinary success in your chosen profession, along
with anything else you attempt.
Lawyer: In exchange for my soul, right?
Devil: No, we've owned that outright for many years. What we want, is the soul of
your wife, your children, and your grandchildren. All of them will bum in hell for
eternity in exchange for your success.
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As such, it was a stroke of evil genius for your eminence to come up with
the idea of creating a governmental program that would corrupt everything and
everyone it touched.20 The program works insidiously so that the citizenry is
unaware of its evils until it is too late. Indeed, they vigorously defend the
program against all criticism, and, ironically enough, believe the program's
critics are allied with us!
I refer, of course, to the Medicare program, whose every feature bears the

of this
distinctive stamp of your subtle genius. Permit me to catalog (in Part II
memo) how the features of the program reflect each of the Seven Deadly Sins.
Part III of this memo outlines how Medicare also undermines two distinctively
American virtues: thrift and truthfulness. Part IV of this memo offers a brief
conclusion.
II Medicareand the Seven Deadly Sins
As you know, the Seven Deadly Sins were first cataloged by Pope Gregory
and have since been analyzed by such luminaries as St. Thomas Aquinas,
Dante, Chaucer, and C.S. Lewis. 21 They have also been featured in recent
Hollywood movies and a wide array of advertisements.22 The remarkable thing
is that your Satanic majesty was able to develop a program incorporating each
and every one of the Seven Deadly Sins, while simultaneously persuading the
populace that it included none of them. This memo reviews each of the Seven

Lawyer: So what's the catch?
Of course, your Satanic majesty is widely known as the king of lawyers, so we had a built-in
advantage with that group. See BENET, supra note I, at 173 ("[W]e know who's the King of
Lawyers, as the Good Book tells us.").
20. See generallySATAN, DESTAILIZING THE AMERICAN REPuBUC WTH A GovERNmErNMANDATED INTERGENERATIONAL PYRAMID SCHEME (Brimstoneware Press 1964) (generally
unavailable, at least in this life).
21. See generallyDANTE ALIGHEi, THE INrFERNO (John Ciardi trans., Signet Classic 2001)
(n.d.); ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" (Fathers of the English Dominican
Province trans., Bums & Oates Wasbourne 1920) (n.d.); GEOFFREY CHAUCER, THE CANTERBuRY
TALES (Nevill Coghill Trans., Penguin Books 2003) (n.d.); LEWIs, supra note I; POPE GREGORY
1,MORALIA INJOB (Tumholti: Brepols 1979) (n.d.).
22. See BEDAZZLED, supra note 7 (listing the Seven Deadly Sins and displaying Satan's
preferred mode of transportation, the Lamborghini Diablo); BEDAZZLED (Twentieth Century Fox
1967) (same, except no Lamborghini Diablo in evidence); SEvEN (NewLine Studios 1995)
(depicting a serial killer who selects victims based on the Seven Deadly Sins). Perhaps the most
ingenious recent use of the Seven Deadly Sins is an ad for Las Vegas, your home away from
home, currently appearing in in-flight magazines. The ad features a poker chip that bears the
legend "Seven Deadly Sins, One Convenient Location." (copy on file with author).
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Deadly Sins and details the ways in which the Medicare program incorporates
and reinforces each one.
A. Avarice
Avarice primarily affects the 1.3 million providers, ranging from
physicians and podiatrists to hospitals, nursing homes, and home health
agencies, who collectively deliver goods and services to Medicare beneficiaries
and receive more than $250 billion per year for their trouble.23 Some of these
providers were wary of the long-term consequences of inviting the federal
government to become a major purchaser of health care services. However, the
government bought them off with promises of staggering amounts of money
and no interference in their professional
autonomy. Of course, you broke both
24
of these promises, the latter first.
Medicare has resulted in extraordinary wealth for providers-not quite
beyond the dreams of avarice, but close. Yet, the whole point of avarice is that
more than most is never quite enough, and providers ceaselessly agitate for
increases in Medicare payments. As a concentrated special interest, providers
have had considerable success in extracting ever-increasing sums from the
federal fisc, in many instances convincing Congress to specify payment rates
well in excess of those that would prevail in a free market.25 Consistent with
our larger goals, Medicare's compensation arrangements pay providers based
on their inputs (procedures performed or time spent) and not their outputs (high

23. There are approximately 6,100 hospitals, 15,000 skilled nursing facilities, 9,300 home
health agencies, 167,000 clinical laboratories, 400 prepaid organizations, and 920,000
physicians who submit bills to Medicare. William Brewbaker, Overview of the Health Care
Marketplace: Structural, Legal & Policy Issues, Slides used in an Address Before the FTC
Health Care Workshop, at http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/healthcare/agenda. htm (Sept. 9, 2002)
(archiving slides that contain information from the Healthcare Financing Administration, 1999
Data Compendium used by Professor Brewbaker in his remarks) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
24. Cf BENET, supra note 1, at 170 ("Well, you couldn't expect fair play from a fellow
like this Mr. Scratch.").
25. See William Sage, The Lawyerization of Medicine, 26 J. HEALTH, POL., POL'Y & L.
1179, 1187-89 (2001) (noting the impact of Medicare on the attitudes and behavior of
physicians and physician groups); Bruce Vladeck, The Political Economy ofMedicare, HEALTH
AFF., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 22, 26-31 (1999) (discussing the role that provider interest groups play
in the ever-increasing price of Medicare). As Professor Vladeck aptly notes, "There are plenty
of $400 toilet seats in the Medicare program, because Medicare cannot deliver services to its
beneficiaries without providers and because providers are major sources of... campaign
contributions in every congressional district in the nation." Id. at 26.

1174

60 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1165 (2003)

quality care actually delivered)--with predictable results on the quality and cost
of care actually delivered.26

To be sure, Congress recognized that some providers would be more
avaricious than others. Congress accordingly enacted a series of fraud control
provisions (anti-kickback, self-referral, and civil false claims) creating
substantial criminal and civil penalties for fraud and abuse, along with a

multidimensional enforcement initiative." Although this fraud control program
was well-intended, we have, through a variety of skillful measures, successfully
redirected it to encourage our larger goals.
First, we ensured that the reach of the fraud statutes would exceed their
(functionally defensible) grasp by criminalizing conduct well beyond that
which was necessary to protect the program. Indeed, we criminalized conduct
that results in benefits to patients without fiscal harm to the program. In short
order, a "speakeasy" norm developed among otherwise law-abiding lawyers and
providers, with predictable consequences as this social norm came into conflict
with the norms of fraud control personnel. 8 The qui tam provisions of the
False Claims Act added fuel to the fire.2 9

26.

See Hyman & Silver, You Get What You Pay For,supranote 4, at 1443 (stating that

the critical failing of Medicare and most health insurance coverage is "the failure to tie
compensation to quality of service or to patients' health"). These problems were recognized
shortly after Medicare was introduced. Indeed, in 1968, President Johnson sent a special
message to Congress requesting the authority to "employ new methods of payment as they prove
effective in providing high quality medical care more efficiently and at lower cost." JOSEPH
CALIFANO, AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE REVOLUTION: WHO LIVES? WHO DIES? WHO PAYS? 53
(1986). Medicare's subsequent payment strategies represent CMS's (and Congress's) ongoing
efforts to address these problems.
27. See Hyman, Market Change, supra note 4, at 534-36 (discussing the antikickback
Claims Act); Paul E. Kalb, Health Care
statute, the self-referral provisions, and the Civil False (same).
Fraudand Abuse, 282 JAMA 1163, 1164-67 (1999)
28. See James F. Blumstein, The Fraudand Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health Care
Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 205, 218 (1996)

(comparing the American health care industry to a speakeasy). As Professor Blumstein states:
The American health care industry is akin to aspeakeasy-conduct that isillegal is
rampant and countenanced by law enforcement officials because the law isso out of
sync with the conventional norms and realities of the marketplace and because
respected leaders of the industry are performing tasks that, while illegal, are
desirable in improving the functioning of the market.
1d. at 218.
29. Knowing your preference for puns, allusions, and impertinent remarks, I littered this
memo with them. Congratulations on spotting the allusion to your immolating inferno. For a
discussion of how the qui tam provisions create incentives to file and settle suits alleging
violations of the False Claims Act, see Hyman, HIPAA, supra note 4, at 153-54.
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Second, we whipped up a frenzy among the public about health care fraud

and created the widespread belief that fraud and abuse are pervasive.3° Indeed,
72% of the American public reportedly believes that Medicare would have no
financial problems if fraud and abuse were eliminated, a perspective utterly

uninformed by any connection with reality, but one that serves our purposes
nonetheless.3' Over time, Americans will begin to doubt the good faith and
reputation for fair dealing that has hitherto prevailed among health care
providers. This demoralization will ultimately redound to our benefit.32
B. Gluttony
Gluttony primarily affects Medicare beneficiaries. At the outset of the
Medicare program, the costs ,of care (both per-beneficiary and total) were
relatively modest, and beneficiaries were responsible for a substantial
percentage of the cost of the care that they received from nonhospital sources.33
However, the politics of Medicare created a one-way ratchet, shifting the
distribution of costs of the Medicare program to the working population and
away from Medicare beneficiaries. Because the working population is, as a
group, less well off than those on Medicare, our efforts have resulted in a
reverse-Robin Hood health care scheme that robs from the (working) poor and
gives to the middle class and the rich.34 The ceaseless lobbying of the elderly
30. To be sure, there is plenty of out-and-out fraud inMedicare-although quantification
has proven difficult. See id. at 158-60 (explaining the difficulties in calculating the magnitude
of fraud and abuse in health care).
31. Id. at 152.
32. Condemnation proceedings routinely result in similar demoralization costsparticularly when private property is taken for nonpublic purposes (for example, a shopping
mall or a parking lot for limousines at a private casino), let alone when the government
(inevitably) offers less-than just compensation. South Carolina provides a particularly
egregious and illustrative example of the incentives to under-compensate property owners in
condemnation proceedings-with the extent of the under-compensation only manifesting itself
after courts accurately categorized the "regulatory taking" as an actual taking. See David A.
Hyman, RegulatingManaged Care: What's Wrong With a PatientBill of Rights, 73 S. CAL. L.
REv. 221, 249, n.93 (2001) ("Thus, once it owned the property, SCCC was unwilling to take a
loss of $77,500 to keep one lot unimproved, but it was perfectly happy in its role as regulator to
impose a cost of more than ten times that amount on Mr. Lucas to keep both lots vacant.").
33.

See RICHARD

EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE?

149-51 (1997) ("The original program was laced with caveats and reeked prudence from every
pore.").
34. This is actually a complicated issue because Medicare beneficiaries as a group have
accumulated considerable assets but are not typically in the work force. Thus, a simple
comparison of income is misleading. Census Bureau data on poverty rates among those older
and younger than sixty-five provide one benchmark. See U.S. CENsus BuREAu, PovERTY iN THE
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population and the advocates for a Medicare prescription drug benefit, when
most of the elderly already receive far more from the public trough than they
ever paid in (and more than is economically sustainable regardless of whether a

prescription drug benefit is added), further demonstrate the gluttony that
Medicare evokes."

The best confirmation of the gluttony evoked by Medicare was the repeal
of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988. 3 Congress passed this
Act with good intentions, overwhelming bipartisan support, and the

enthusiastic endorsement of groups purporting to represent the elderly. The
Act created coverage against catastrophic medical expenditures for Medicare
beneficiaries-and coverage against catastrophes is, after all, the core purpose
of insurance. 37 The Act also provided for prescription drug coverage, a subject
which continues to vex Congress fifteen years later.38 In a humiliating aboutface, Congress, under immense public pressure, repealed the Catastrophic
Coverage Act less than a year after enacting it. One of the most searing images
for a risk-averse Congressman desirous of re-election was the spectacle of Dan
Rostenkowski, House Ways and Means Chairman and one of the most
powerful men in Congress, fleeing a crowd of irate senior citizens protesting

UNITED STATES: 2000, at 4 fig. 2 (Sept. 2001) (demonstrating that, since 1994, poverty rates for
those sixty-five years and over have been lower than or approximately equal to those eighteen to
sixty-four and, since 1974, substantially lower than those under eighteen), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001 pubs/p60-214.pdf. Because those under eighteen are typically
supported by those between eighteen and sixty-four, there is some indication that the subsidies
flow in the direction indicated in the text. For those interested in a less intuitive approach, see
MARK MCCLELLAN & JONATHAN SKINNER, THE INCIDENCE OF MEDICARE (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research Working Paper w6013, 1997) (finding that relatively regressive financing
mechanisms, higher expenditures and longer survival times ofwealthier beneficiaries have led
to net transfers from the poor to the wealthy).
35. See C. EUGENE STEUERLE & ADAM CARAsso, LIFETIME SOCIAL SECURITY AND
MEDICARE BENEFITS

(The Urban Institute, Straight Talk Policy Brief No. 36, March 2003)

(stating that the amount of payroll taxes paid by current retirees is "dwarfed" by the amount of
benefits received), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/ 310667 straight36.pdf.
36. See ROBERT E. MOFFIT, THE LAST TIME CONGRESS REFORMED HEALTHCARE: A
LAWMAKERS GUIDE TO THE MEDICARE CATASTROPHIC COVERAGE DEBATE (The Heritage
Foundation, Backgrounder No. 996), at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Health
Care/BG996.cfm (Aug. 4, 1994) (discussing the repeal of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage
Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also RICHARD HIMMELFARB,
CATASTROPHIC POLITICS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THEM EDICARE CATASTROPHIC COVERAGE ACT
OF 1988, at 1 (1995) (explaining the events surrounding the passage and repeal of the

Catastrophic Coverage Act).
37. See Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, H.R. 2470, 100th Cong. § 101
(expanding the scope of Medicare coverage under Part A).
38. See id. § 202 (allowing prescription drug coverage under some circumstances).
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One senior citizen even jumped on the hood

of Congressman Rostenkowski's car-a visual image beyond even our wildest
expectations. 40 The fact that Congressman Rostenkowski lost his bid for reelection shortly after this incident reinforced the risks of "messing with
Medicare" for even the dullest members of Congress. The principal sin of the
Catastrophic Coverage Act (and I use the term ironically because the bill was

actually exceedingly virtuous and we benefited greatly from its repeal) was that
it imposed the costs of expanded coverage on the population that would benefit
from the expansion. 4' Predictably enough, gluttony turns out to be less
appealing if one must foot the bill.

Thankfully, the voting power of the elderly has ensured that the "mistake"
of the Catastrophic Coverage Act will never be repeated. Every subsequent
election cycle has featured shameless pandering by both political parties to the
preferences of the elderly for more extensive (and expensive) Medicare
coverage. Of course, this gluttony only accelerates the day of reckoning that we
have worked toward since you first proposed the Medicare program.
C. Envy
Envy has been the most disappointing of the Seven Deadly Sins. We have
been, at best, only moderately successful at evoking envy among the nonelderly

39. See Fred Brock, A Health Care Revolt, Remembered, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, at
BUi5 (describing senior citizen protest of Catastrophic Coverage Act). As the article notes,
In the summer of 1989, Mr. Rostenkowski, then a congressman from Illinois and
the powerful chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, was besieged by
a crowd of 50 senior citizens in Chicago. According to The Chicago Tribune, the
protesters-shouting "coward," "recall" and "impeach"-forced him to sprint
through a gas station to his car, where minutes earlier an elderly demonstrator had
been sprawling across the hood. The protesters were angry about a new law that
provided catastrophic coverage for Medicare recipients, but with an income-tax
surcharge of up to $800 a year that was set to rise to $ 1,050 in 1993. That law was
soon repealed. But the television images of Mr. Rostenkowski under assault struck
fear in the hearts of politicians that remains to this day. Few want to be pitted
against older people on issues involving Medicare.
see
also Dick Thompson, The Third Rail of U.S. Politics, TIME, Feb. 27, 1995, at 21
Id.;
("[P]revious attempts to tinker with the health insurance enjoyed by 36.3 million aging voters
have earned Medicare the title of 'the third rail of American politics.' Touch it and you're
dead.").
40. See Brock, supra note 39, at BUI5 (recounting Congressman Rostenkowski's
encounter with an irate senior citizen).
41. See MOFFIT, supra note 36, at 33-34 (explaining the financing of the Catastrophic
Coverage Act).
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population. Those not covered by Medicare have certainly grown tired of the
restrictions and limitations imposed by the private coverage market. As the last

bastion of fee-for-service health care, Medicare is routinely presented as if it
offers open-ended affordable access to all necessary goods and services without
government red-tape. Yet popular envy has been tempered by the realization
that Medicare is only "affordable" because of the infusion of billions and
billions of dollars in cross-subsidies from the rest of the population. Despite

our best attempts to package it as "Medicare for all," there has been no popular
uprising in favor of a one-payor system.
Part of our problem is that it has proven difficult to persuade people that
Medicare is "hassle-free," particularly when providers and prominent
Congressmen routinely complain about the inadequacies and inefficiencies of
CMS and promise to eliminate it.42 We can take some credit for this outcome
42. Indeed, at a recent Federal Trade Commission/Department of Justice hearing, CMS
Administrator Tom Scully, with his tongue thoroughly in his cheek, suggested that the
Administration had actually changed the name of HCFA to CMS because everyone hated HCFA
and changing the name would confuse people. See Healthcare and Competition Law and
Policy: Hearing Before the FTC 26 (Feb. 26, 2003) (statement of Thomas Scully, CMS
Administrator)
(discussing the decision to rename
HCFA), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/healthcarehearings/030226trans.pdf. As Administrator Scully reported:
The fact is, the health care market, whatever there is in health care, is extremely
muted and extremely screwed up and it's largely because of my agency. For those
of you who don't follow CMS, which used to be called HCFA, we changed the
name because it was so well loved. I always say it's kind of like when Enron comes
out of bankruptcy, they'll probably change their name. So, HCFA-Secretary
Thompson and I decided to confuse everybody. We changed the name to CMS for
a couple of years so people wouldn't realize we're actually HCFA. So far, it's
worked reasonably well.
Id.; see also Goldstein, supranote 10, at A31 ("The Health Care Financing Administration--the
comer of the federal government that, perhaps more than any other, politicians loved to hate-is
a relic of the past."); Ellen Nakashima & Ceci Connolly, Wanted: A HCFA By Any Other
Name, WASH. PosT, June 12, 2001, at A23 (noting the name change). Nakashima and Connolly
wrote:
The $436 billion agency oversees Medicare and Medicaid programs, and is said to
have three times as many regulations as the IRS. Not surprisingly, it is disliked by
nearly everyone except its beneficiaries. It's too restrictive, requires too many
forms to be filled out, takes ages to reimburse claims, go the complaints.
Id. Robert Pear, Medicare Agency Changes Name in an Effort to Emphasize Service, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 2001, at A26 (expanding on the practical effect of HCFA's name change). Pear
stated:
But it will take more than a name change to alter the culture of the agency, which
has been harshly criticized by members of Congress from both parties, who
describe it as a rigid, heavy-handed regulator, more eager to set prices than to
encourage competition or reward efficient providers of care.
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because we persuaded Congress to increase the obligations of CMS while
simultaneously starving them of resources, all the while encouraging
Medicare's proponents to brag about its low administrative overhead.43
We have also had some success creating envy within the Medicare
population by carefully designing the program to maximize hard feelings along
geographic lines. Because local costs of production' and treatment patterns
directly affect reimbursement, the cost to the Medicare program (and hence the
amount of resources spent per beneficiary) varies greatly among the several
states, as well as within those states. 44 In the nation as a whole, average
Medicare payments per beneficiary were $5,994 in Fiscal Year 200 1, but they
ranged from a high of $8,099 in Louisiana to a low of $3,414 in Iowa.45 One
group of commentators has estimated that we could buy each and every
Medicare beneficiary in Florida who agreed to receive their health care in
Minnesota a fully-loaded Lexus and the Medicare program would still come out

43. See GEN. ACCOUNT[NG OFFICE, GAO-01 -817, MEDICARE MANAGEMENT: CMS FACES
CHALLENGES TO SUSTAIN PROGRESS 2 (200 1) (concluding that CMS's administrative budget has
not kept pace with its workload); Hyman, Does Medicare CareAbout Quality?,supra note 4, at
63-64 ("CMS's 'overhead' to run [Medicare] is a shockingly low two percent-barely enough
to keep the lights on and certainly not enough to pay for aggressive oversight of the quality of
care."); see also Stuart M. Butler et al., Open Letter to Congress & the Executive: Crisis Facing
HCFA & Millions of Americans, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 8 (asserting that HFCA is
under-funded). As the open letter explained:
Over the past decade Congress has directed the agency to implement, administer,
and regulate an increasing number of programs that derive from highly complex
legislation. While vast new responsibilities have been added to its heavy workload,
some of its most capable administrative talent has departed or retired; other
employees have been reassigned as a consequence of reductions in force. At the
same time, neither Democratic nor Republican administrations have requested
administrative budgets of a size that were in any way commensurate with HCFA's
growing challenge.
Id.
44. See IOWA CARES ABOUT MEDICARE, CHART: MEDICARE PROGRAM PAYMENTS PER
ENROLLEE BY STATE, at http://www.iowamedicare. org/charts/payment.pdf (last visited Jan. 21,

2004) (using data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to graphically
demonstrate state-by-state variations in Medicare payments per beneficiary) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
45. Id. These figures are deceptive because many Iowa residents receive their health care
in Minnesota. These expenditures do not appear in the numerator (health expenses in Iowa), but
the residents are counted in the denominator (Medicare beneficiaries in Iowa). See State-level
variation in Medicare spending: preliminary observations, Public Meeting of the Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission 1-4 (April 26, 2002) (statement of David Glass) (explaining
that payment differences between states may be misleading because many beneficiaries go
outside their home state to use health care services), available at http://www.
medpac.gov/publicmeetings/transcripts /0426_statelevelvariationsDG transc.pdf.
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ahead.4 6 Although the Dartmouth Atlas 47 helped surface some of these
disparities, most of the credit goes to Medicare managed care, which required
CMS to determine and publish the average payments per Medicare beneficiary per
county in order to calculate the (somewhat-lesser) amount that should be paid to a
Medicare+Choice Organization (MCO) providing services to a Medicare
beneficiary in that county.4" To the extent the non-risk-adjusted premium exceeded
the competitive level of payment, MCOs dissipated payments through non-price
competition, resulting in visibly high MCO benefits for Medicare beneficiaries in
some counties and "bare-bones" benefits for beneficiaries in others.4
This geographically-driven envy has precipitated a "formula fight" among the
several states, complete with litigation, ° coalitions of aggrieved states and senior
citizens,5 ' and coverage in newspapers and editorials.52 We are particularly lucky
46. See generally John E. Wennberg et al., Geography and the Debate Over Medicare
Reform, HEALTH AFF. WEB ExCLUSIVE (Feb. 13, 2002) (demonstrating substantial regional
variation in Medicare expenditures and treatment patterns, without discernable positive effect on
outcome or health status), at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.96vl .pdf (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
47. DARTMOUTH MEDICAL SCHOOL'S CENTER FOR THE EVALUATIVE CLINICAL SCIENCES,
TiE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTHCARE, at http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/ (last visited Jan. 21,
2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
48. See Note from Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, to Medicare and Choice
Organizations and Other Interested Parties, at http://cms.hhs.gov/healthplans/rates/2004/
cover.asp (May 12, 2003) (noting that § 1853(b)(4) of the Social Security Act requires CMS to
release county-specific per capita fee-for-service expenditure information on an annual basis)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
49. See William M. Sage & Peter J.Hammer, Competing on Quality of Care: The Need to
Develop a Competition Policy For Health Care Markets, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1069, 1073
n.7 (1999) ("[T]he resulting windfall is often transformed into higher enrollee benefits, such as
outpatient prescription drug coverage, as Medicare HMOs competed with one another on nonprice grounds."); see also Medicare Justice Coalition, Statement of Rose Grigsby, Victim of
Medicare Injustice, at http://www.mnseniors.net/mjcgrigsby.html (Nov. 17, 1999) (discussing
her personal experiences with benefit variation between Arizona and Minnesota) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Peter Wyckoff, Medicare Justice Coalition Opening
Comments, at http://www.mnseniors.net/mjcwyckoff.html (last visited Jan. 21,2004) (providing
concrete examples of benefit disparities between counties caused by nonprice competition) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Review).
50. See generally Minn. Senior Fed'n, Metro. Region v. United States, 273 F.3d 805 (8th
Cir. 2001) (challenging unsuccessfully a Medicare payment formula that resulted in geographic
variation in payment levels on the grounds that it interfered with the constitutional right to
travel), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 939 (2002).
51. See, e.g., THE GEOGRAPHIC COALITION HOMEPAGE FOR A FAIR MEDICARE
REIMBURSEMENT SYSTEM, http://www.mnmed.org/images/Gc/index.htm (last visited Aug. 24,
2003) (summarizing the Geographic Coalition) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Medicare Justice Coalition, Statement of Barbara Kaufman, Medicare Justice
Coalition Spokesperson, at http://www.mnseniors.net/mjckaufman.html (Nov. 17, 1999)
(describing the goals of the Medicare Justice Coalition, agrassroots, senior consumer coalition)

1181

MEDICARE MEETS MEPHISTOPHELES

that the Senate Finance Committee is disproportionately composed of Senators from
low-cost states who are extremely aggrieved that the Medicare money train does not
unload a "fair share" of Medicare money in their states.5 a We expect this issue to
become even more salient if Medicare MCOs in high-cost areas start attracting
patients by paying them cold hard cash and not just offering enhanced benefits.
We have also had considerable success with envy among providers. Those
currently included within Medicare compare their payment rate to that of other
covered providers and ceaselessly agitate to have "their" services compensated more
highly. Providers who are excluded from Medicare agitate to be included. Medical
device manufacturers lobby to have their devices covered and lobby against
Medicare's attempts to impose a cost-effectiveness test on coverage.54 Interestingly,
pharmaceutical manufacturers are the only organized group that has no real interest
in expanding their presence in Medicare and they have lobbied heavily against
adding an outpatient prescription drug benefit. 55
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); MMA ONLINE,
LINKS

TO STATE

HOMEPAGES

FOR

A FAIR

MEDICARE

GEOGRAPIC COALITION
SYSTEM, at

REIMBURSEMENT

http://www.mnmed.org/images/GC/members.html (last visited Jan. 21,2004) (providing weblinks to the Geographic Coalition State homepages) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). The Geographic Coalition is comprised of twenty-four states who believe that they
receive inadequate Medicare payments. See Press Release, University of Wisconsin
Cooperative Extension, Wisconsin's Suit Against Medicare, at http://www.uwex.edu/ces/flp
/health/wimedicarelawsuit.html (last updated May 1,2002) (noting that "[g]rassroots organizing
is expanding with consumer and provider groups from Oregon, California, North Dakota, Iowa,
South Dakota, and Wisconsin") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
52.

See IOWA CARES ABOUT MEDICARE

COALITION, MEDICARE EQUITY IN THE

NEWS, at

http://www.iowamedicare.org/news.shtml (last visited Sept. 30, 2003) (providing web-links to
over forty news articles and editorials regarding Medicare fairness) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
53. Senator Chuck Grassley from Iowa is the Majority Leader on the Senate Finance
Committee. Senator Max Baucus from South Dakota is the Minority Leader on the Senate
Finance Committee. Both Iowa and South Dakota are members of the Geographic Coalition.
See supranote 51 (discussing the Geographic Coalition). Of the remaining nineteen members,
nine are from states that are members of the Geographic Coalition. See http://finance.senate.gov
/sitepages/committee.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2003) (listing Senate Finance Committee
members and their respective states) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For
those who cannot do the math, that means 48% of the states belong to the Geographic Coalition,
but 58% of the members of the Senate Finance Committee are from those states-including both
the Majority and Minority Leaders.
54. See Susan Bartlett Foote, Why Medicare Cannot Promulgatea NationalCoverage
Rule: A Case of Regula Mortis, 27 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 707,708-20 (2002) (explaining
how the medical device industry has prevented the implementation of cost-effective coverage
rules through the process of regula mortis). "Regula Mortis occurs when a mobilized interest
group blocks legitimate administrative agency action, causing a regulatory stalemate." Id. at
707.
55. Of course, to the extent that the pharmaceutical companies' products are already
covered by Medicare, they maneuverjust like any other provider to enhance their revenues and
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D. Sloth

Sloth affects two important groups: legislators and program administrators.
To be sure, Congress tinkers with numerous aspects of Medicare on a more-orless annual basis, but it has paid almost no attention to the long-term financial
problems facing Medicare. As outlined in Part III, Medicare's financing is a
ticking time-bomb that will explode within the next two generations. The
sooner this problem is addressed, the less severe the resulting dislocations will
be. Yet legislative sloth, confirmed by past history, ensures that any solution
will be deferred until a true crisis emerges-and by the time the crisis emerges,
legislators will have more difficulty solving the problem. So much for the oftheard claims about the superior ability of government to mind the interests of
future generations and attend to long-term problems.5 6 Your efforts in selling
this myth have been particularly effective.
Program administrators are also affected by sloth, at least with regard to
quality and, to a lesser extent, fraud control. When one is purchasing health
care, cost, quality, and access are all important. Yet, Medicare program
administrators care a lot about cost, less about access, and, at least historically,
not at all about quality.57 This sloth is no accident. Indeed, at your behest,
Medicare was designed at every turn to focus program administrators on cost
and access and to discount quality.58 The Medicare statute explicitly provides
that any provider who meets the entry requirements is entitled to participate in
the program, and that patients are free to choose any provider who will have
them. 9 Thus, CMS has very little ability to exclude providers who deliver poor

shrink those of their rivals. See Denise Gellene, Drug-Firm Rivalry Spills into Congress, L.A.

TIMES, Apr. 9,2003, at CI (noting a battle between Amgen, Inc. and Johnson & Johnson over
payments for anemia medication).
56. Belief in this particular fairy tale is particularly pervasive among enthusiasts of
progressive causes. Yet, neither theory nor practice provide any basis for believing that the
political system will protect the interests of future voters-let alone future nonvoters. See
Richard A. Epstein, Why Is Health Care Special?, 40 U. KAN. L. REv. 307, 311 (1992) ("It
would be easy to assume that collective responses are preferred when markets are corrupt and
governments virtuous. It is far harder to reach that conclusion when self-interest and corruption
creates difficulties from both quarters.").
57. See Hyman, Does Medicare Care About Quality?, supra note 4, at 56 (arguing that
the Medicare program does not place enough value on quality).
58. See id. at 63 ("By training, history, and inclination, CMS administrators are interested
in the prompt and efficient processing payment of claims .... Quality of care has never really
been on CMS's agenda .... Indeed, the original Medicare Statute explicitly prohibits any
federal employee from interfering with the practice of medicine.").
59.

Id.
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quality care or to reward providers whose quality is exemplary.6 ° Similarly, the
administrative structure of Medicare-all bills are processed by carriers and
intermediaries, who view their job as paying bills as quickly and cheaply as
possible-also'helped contribute to administrative sloth. 6'
It was also an act of inspired genius to draw the original administrators of
Medicare from the ranks of the Social Security Administration. Social Security
administrators had considerable experience and expertise in running a program
that was based on the payment of a sum certain to qualified beneficiaries and
no experience whatsoever with purchasing health care services. The
predictable result was that CMS personnel were extremely focused on whether
beneficiaries had access to the statutorily-specified services, the total amount of
money required to accomplish that objective, and the prompt and efficient
processing and payment of claims, and they paid relatively little attention to
everything else. Shoveling money out the door to purchase health care services
is, of course, not the same thing as purchasing high-quality health care.
These patterns have continued to the present day. Even if program
administrators were inclined to exercise their marketing muscle on behalf of
program beneficiaries, the basic structure of Medicare-the "good
government/due process" requirement for public notice and comment on
virtually everything it does, the chronic under-funding of administrative
capacity, and the multiplicity of tasks that CMS is charged with-means that
sloth will continue to prevail regardless of the enthusiasm, hard work, and
promises made by program administrators.62
Finally, in a diabolical stroke of genius, we have succeeded in
undermining all attempts to rouse administrators from their sloth through the
60. Id. Indeed, CMS's minimal efforts to steer patients by designating "centers of
excellence" for cardiac and orthopedic surgery have triggered extensive lobbying and
discontent. See David Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health
Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 23, 35 (2001) ("Medicare has had limited
success with its attempts to designate 'centers of excellence' for cardiac and orthopedic surgery,
as providers have claimed that the centers are being selected primarily on grounds of cost, rather
than quality."); Am.Hosp. ASS'N, POLICY BRIEF 99-3, IMPLICATIONS OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S
PLAN TO MODERNIZE THE TRADITIONAL FEE-FOR-SERVICE MEDICARE PROGRAM, at
http://www.hospitalconnect.com/ahaadvocacy-grassrootstadvocacy/resourcespolicybrief82799.htmi
(Aug. 27, 1999) (detailing AHA criticisms of initiative) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
61. See Hyman, Does Medicare Care About Quality?, supra note 4, at 60 (analyzing
incentives created by the administrative structure of Medicare).
62. See id. at 64 (analyzing the difficulties in leveraging Medicare's purchasing power
given the administrative structure of Medicare). Ex post enforcement strategies, including fraud
prosecutions for low quality care, do not solve these problems, and in important respects, run
the risk of making them worse. See Hyman, Market Change, supra note 4, at 540 (questioning
the effectiveness of ex post sanctions in dealing with the problems facing Medicare).
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judicious use of political oversight.63 Any attempt by CMS to transform itself
from a passive payor of bills to an active manager with broad responsibility for
beneficiary health by using tools such as selective contracting and payment for
performance, among others, will necessarily result in shifts in patient flows
(and payments) among providers. Adversely affected providers lobby heavily
to forestall this fate, with the outcome dictated by the political power of those
providers instead of the quality and efficiency with which the underlying
services are delivered. 64 Demonstration projects have triggered similar
dynamics, when a demonstration project is successful, CMS lacks the authority
to implement it more broadly, and when a demonstration is not successful,
political constraints can make it impossible to terminate. 65 Political opposition
killed at least one demonstration project before it ever got off the ground.66
63. See Vladeck, supra note 25, at 22-31 (analyzing the political restraints on Medicare
administrators and administration).
64. See NAT'L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., STUDY PANEL ON FEE-FOR-SERVICE MEDICARE, FROM A
GENERATION BEHIND TO A GENERATION AHEAD: TRANSFORMING TRADITIONAL MEDICARE, at

http://www.nasi.org/usr-doc/med_report-genbehind.pdf (Jan. 1998) ("The fee-for-service
program has been open to all qualified providers; reforms that would limit the number or type of
participating providers.., could result in substantial, or even fatal losses to some provider
organizations. This could clearly generate major political problems in specific areas.") (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review; see also AM. HosP. ASS'N, supra note 60 (arguing
for "fairness" in public programs). The AHA Brief explained:
"It is essential that there be an element of fairness in public programs. Given
[CMS'sI market share, the extent to which it is authorized to selectively contract
with providers could cause large shifts in patient volumes among providers,
resulting in the potential for significant financial losses, closures, and other changes
in the delivery system. The financial losers would look to Congress for new
protections."
Id.
65. Comparing the Traditional Medicare Program to Private Insurance: Hearing Before
the Senate Finance Committee (testimony of Paul Ginsburg), http://finance.senate.gov/512gins.htm (May 12, 1999) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
66. See Bryan Dowd et al., A Tale of Four Cities: Medicare Reform and Competitive
Pricing, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 2000, at 9, 11 (explaining how Congress "acceded to industry
pressure" and abandoned the Baltimore competitive-pricing demonstrations for Medicare Part C
in 1996); see also Lessonsfrom the Competitive Pricing Advisory Committee Experience for the
Medicare+Choice Program and Long Term Reform: Hearing Before the Senate Finance
Committee (testimony of Len Nichols), http://www.urban.org/TESTIMON/nichols04-0301.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2003) (discussing Medicare pricing reform) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Nichols explained:
Once local opposition galvanized, CPAC [Competitive Pricing Advisory
Committee] members and HCFA professional staff were not well equipped to
solicit defensive support among Members of Congress. If one Member cares a lot,
and most other Members are basically indifferent, he can get what he wants,
eventually. So, Medicare pricing reform will occur only when the leadership
decides it really wants to do that, and prevents amendments like the one that
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Those advocating such efforts will also be legislatively savaged for their
troubles. As such, sloth has predictably become the dominant strategy for riskaverse program administrators.
E. Lust
The Medicare program induces lust for program expansion and
political power among members of the Democratic Party.67 Democrats
lust to extend the "security" of Medicare to the balance of the population
and ceaselessly campaign to do so. These unknowing pawns write
endlessly about the supposed virtues of a government-run health system,
monopolizing the op-ed page of the New York Times and major medical
journals.68 In a real tribute to your powers, these advocates actually
believe they are engaged in God's work! Although we occasionally
encourage their efforts by allowing public referenda on the adoption of a
one-payor system 69 and periodically tantalize them with proposals to add
the "near-elderly" to Medicare,7 ° we adhere to your original plan to resist
program expansion at all costs. As you correctly perceived many years
ago, allowing everyone into Medicare will immediately bankrupt the
stopped the CPAC demos in their tracks.
Id.

67. No cheap shots about Medicare and Viagra here. No sir. We draw the line at that
kind of easy laugh. Well, maybe just one. Did you hear the one about the guy who joined a
Medicare HMO because he thought it covered his Viagra? It did not. See In the Case of Blue
Shield of California, Medicare Appeals Council (June 20, 2003) (denying coverage to a
beneficiary seeking Viagra), http://www.hhs.gov/dab/macdecision/ blueshieldca.htm (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
68. See, e.g., David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, A NationalHealth Program
for the United States: A Physician's Proposal, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 102, 102-08 (1989)

(proposing anational health care program that covers all medical services); Marcia Angell, The
Forgotten Domestic Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, at WK 13 (arguing that the United States
needs a national, single-payor system). The most zealous advocates are found in two groups:
Physicians for a National Health Program, and Everybody In,Nobody Out. See EVERYBODY IN,
NOBODY OUT... THE ESSENCE OF UNIVERSAL HEALTHCARE, at http://www.everybodyinnobody
out.org/MissState.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2004) (providing an overview of an organization
with the goal of guaranteeing universal access to health care) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); PHYSICIANS FOR A NATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAM, at http://pnhp.org/ (last
visited Jan. 21, 2004) (describing aprogram that will purportedly pay for all health care) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
69. Not surprisingly, these efforts have focused on "Blue America," with referenda held at
various times in Maine, Massachusetts, and Oregon.
70. See Robert J. Samuelson, Salesman in Chief WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1998, at A19
(noting Clinton's proposal to allow sixty-two to sixty-four-year olds to buy into Medicare).
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program because the cross-subsidies that sustain Medicare are only achievable
if there are sufficient marks outside the program to pay the necessary funds into
the program. Program beneficiaries understand this point perfectly well. The
demise of the Clinton plan was inevitable once it became clear that the plan
would "take" from the elderly and "give" to the uninsured.7 1 We are far better
off delaying the day of reckoning by a few years and allowing the gluttony of
Medicare beneficiaries and the passage of time to increase the number of
unsustainable commitments, meaning that the fall of the American republic
from grace will be even more precipitous.
Medicare also provides Democrats with the tools to satisfy their lust for
power. Of course, the lust for power is innate in all politicians and political
parties, but Democrats disproportionately emphasize Medicare in their appeals
to the electorate. This strategy is consistent with the basic position of
Democrats that the "highest purpose of government is to send people checks in
the mail."" The proof of these claims is in the pudding. Political polling has
consistently demonstrated that voters trust the Democrats more than the
Republicans when it comes to Medicare. 3 Exploiting this asymmetry,
Democrats use Medicare as a bludgeon against their Republican adversaries at
every conceivable turn regardless of the actual differences between the parties,

71. See EPSTEIN, supra note 33, at 200-02 ("At crunch time, AARP members and
Medicare recipients stood four-square behind universal access to medical care-for all persons
over 65. They rightly understood that the greatest peril to their care came from offering the
same entitlements to persons under 65."). To be sure, an additional factor working in our favor
is the skepticism of many Americans about government-run health care. Id. at 190-91.
Notwithstanding initial favorable press coverage, the Clinton plan suffered substantial decreases
in public support as its details became clear. Id. It was obvious that we passed the tipping point
when bumper stickers appeared announcing "National Health Care?-The compassion of the
IRS!-The efficiency of the post office!-AIl at Pentagon prices!" See THEDA SKOCPOL,
BOOMERANG: CLINTON'S HEALTH SECURITY EFFORT AND THE TURN AGAINST GOVERNMENT IN

U.S. POLITICS Introductory Page Preceding Preface (1996) (quoting a bumper sticker on an
aging Chevrolet in 1994). Of course, once we completely take over the American Republic, we
will be able to decisively address such impertinence instead of relying on our contacts in the
media and academia to spread our message.
72. Nicholas Lemann, America Right and Left, THE ATLANTIC ONLINE (Apr. 1998), at
http://www.theatlantic.comlissues/98apr/leftrite.htm (Apr. 1998) (book review) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
73. David Espo, PartiesDebate Medicare, Soc. Sec., AP ONLINE, June 18, 2002 (noting
Democrat's edge in polling), at 2002 WL 22581318. Espo states:
Recent polling gives Republicans reason to be nervous, at least when it comes to
Medicare and Social Security. A survey taken for Rep. J.C. Watts, R-Okla.,
reported that Democrats are favored, 48-34, on their handling of Social Security.
On drugs and health care, the Democratic advantage .was 48-31.
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the bipartisanship of the effort, and the financial straits in which Medicare finds
itself.
For example, in the 2002 Congressional election, one Maryland
Democratic candidate argued that his Republican opponent was "antiMedicare" because she voted for the 1986 Catastrophic Coverage Act-along

with the rest of the Maryland Congressional delegation and an overwhelming
majority of Congress. 74 More generally, the Democratic party's "talking
points" for the 2002 election reduced to the claim that the Republicans did not
care about the elderly, a fact "demonstrated" by their refusal to enact a
Medicare prescription drug benefit even though the (Republican) House had
actually passed a Medicare prescription drug benefit-albeit one not to the taste
of the Democrats. In the 2000 presidential election, Vice President Gore
repeatedly accused the Republicans of planning to cut Medicare to pay for tax
cuts. 7
In the previous two presidential elections, President Clinton was
particularly effective at using Medicare to score political points against the

Republicans, even using it to recover from the devastating losses suffered by
the Democrats in the 1994 election.7 6 Indeed, the basis for President Clinton's
1996 re-election campaign was referred to by party operatives as M2E2 , or MeMe, short for Medicare, Medicaid, education and the environment.77
74. See Andrew A. Green, 2nd District Debate Features Collegiality, Jabs, BALT. SUN,
Oct. 29, 2002, at 3B (noting that Democrat C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger ran anegative television
campaign criticizing Republican Helen Delich Bentley for voting to add Catastrophic Coverage
to Medicare).
75. See Dana Milbank, The Campaign Seasoning: The Flavor ofthe Week, WASH. POST,
Sept. 30, 2000, at C4 (discussing Vice President Gore's campaign strategy regarding Medicare).
76. See Noam Scheiber, The Old Way, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 11, 2002, at 20, 21 ("When
Newt Gingrich proposed a $270 billion tax cut just as Republicans were 'slowing the growth of
Medicare' by roughly the same amount in 1996, Bill Clinton connected the dots-not only
killing the tax cut, but reviving his presidency along the way."); Carl M. Cannon, Medicare
Fiscal Woes Accelerate, BALT. SUN, June 6, 1996, at IA (noting Medicare's political
importance). Cannon reports:
For the past eight months, Clinton's popularity has been rising-and that of
congressional Republicans plummeting-in the face of Democratic accusations that
Republicans favor "extreme" cuts in Medicare and other social programs, far in
excess of what is required, to help pay for tax cuts to benefit the wealthy.
Id.
77. See Bill Dauster, The Election Is Over. Where Do We Go from Here?, Remarks
Before the American Association for Budget and Policy Analysis, at http://www.geocities.comdemcrat/newelection.html (Nov. 21, 1996) ("You may well recognize the President's particular
words: 'Medicare, Medicaid, education and the environment.' Democrats have, in the language
of politics, stayed "on message." When politicians speak these words, staffers and reporters
write 'MMEE' and refer to 'double-M, double-E' or 'M-squared, E-squared."') (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); News Hour with Jim Lehrer: Reaction to the Second
Clinton/Dole Debate, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/debatingourdestiny/newshour/96reax
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These efforts have been extraordinarily successful. Significant portions of
the elderly population distrust Republicans when it comes to Medicare, even
though the financial differences between the Republican and Democratic
proposals for Medicare are exceedingly modest.7" The Democratic message has
been quite effective in overcoming the collective action problems of organizing
the elderly, but it has been less successful in creating broad-based confidence in
the program. In a recent poll, approximately one-half of young women polled
thought that the soap opera GeneralHospitalwould outlast Medicare.79
From a larger philosophical perspective,
Chris Matthews has usefully divided the parties into the "mommy party,"
the Democrats, and the "daddy party," the Republicans. When times are
good, you turn to mom, who promises to provide more services and more
compassion, and demands less personal responsibility. But when threats
loom, Americans turn to dad, who takes no guff from us but also reaches
for the Winchester
hanging over the front door when hostile strangers
80
approach.

As the quintessential mommy party program, Medicare has been a critical part
of the platform for Democrats and the key to victory in many swing districts. I
note in passing that it was only with considerable last minute lobbying that we
were able to forestall attempts to rename HCFA the Medicare and Medicaid
Agency. The acronym for the new agency would have been MAMA-allowing
even the dimmest to see the implications of your plans.8
_partisans_ 10-16.html (PBS television broadcast, Oct. 16, 1996) ("It's the me-me campaign,
Medicare, environment, Medicaid, education. Me, me, me.") (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
78.
HEALTH

See, e.g., Uwe E. Reinhardt, Demagoguery and Debate Over Medicare Reform,
AFF., Winter 1995, at 101, 101 (detailing the similarities between Democrat and

Republican budgetary proposals for Medicare).
79. See Memorandum from Rich Thau, Third Millenium, to Frank Luntz and Jeffrey
Pollock, http://www.thirdmil.org/publications/surveys/0103medicarefindings.html (Mar. 14,
2001 ) (discussing a survey of 500 Americans ages eighteen to thirty-four in which a majority of
young women believed that General Hospital will outlast the Medicare system) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
80. Mona Charen, The Bumbler Bowls Them Over, JEWISH WORLD REV. (Nov. 8,2002),
at http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/charenl 10802.asp (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
8 I. See Pear, supra note 42, at A26 (discussing alternative acronym). Pear stated:
Mr. Thompson said he had considered naming the agency the Medicare and
Medicaid Administration-MAMA, for short. But, he said, women found that
acronym insulting. Also, it reinforced an image ofthe agency as paternalistic, or in
this case maternalistic, at a time when President Bush wants Medicare beneficiaries
to take more responsibility for their health insurance options.
ld.; see also supra note 10 (providing additional background on the dispute as to whether to
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To be sure, there is some evidence that Medicare has become an equalopportunity club for use against one's political opponents, regardless of party
affiliation. As a former Democrat Congressman ruefully observed,
[T]here is no better subject for effective negative campaigning than a vote
to slow the growth of the Medicare program with whatever cost cutting or
benefit denying or premium increasing it may involve.
Any member knows that however good or decent a Medicare reform bill
may be, his opponent in his next campaign will use a vote for that bill
against him. It does not take a clairvoyant to see what the television
commercial will be: "When he had the chance to protect Medicare, the
program that provides health care to all of us in our vulnerable old age, our
congressman, [your name here], voted instead to protect the special
interests by increasing the premiums." Forget about all the cuts in payment
to doctors and hospitals, which pay for 90 percent of the funding changes.
"He voted to protect the special interests by increasing the premiums we all
must pay for doctor and hospital care."8 2 An opponent has to be an idiot not
to make campaign hay with that vote.
Thus, Medicare has proven to be a cost-effective scourge of both political
parties, allowing each to satisfy their lust for power, while simultaneously
undermining their ability to govern effectively once in office.
F. Anger
Medicare triggers anger among members of the Republican Party. As
previously noted, the Democrats have been quite successful at positioning
themselves as the protectors of the Medicare program and of program
beneficiaries. The Republicans cannot "outbid" the Democrats on Medicare
without busting the budget, and Democrats have routinely and effectively
demagogued Republican efforts to make even minor revisions to the financing
of Medicare and its delivery options. Not surprisingly, Republicans are angry
about the effectiveness with which a large command-and-control program,
which is inexorably gobbling up an ever increasing share of federal tax
revenues, has become a sacrosanct feature of American politics.8 3 The madder

rename HCFA to MaMA, CMMS, or CMS). Thankfully, "top men" were on hand to resolve the
matter. See supra note I1 (quoting Raiders of the Lost Ark).
82. Anthony Beilenson, Leadershipand Politics: FourViews, in MEDICARE: PREPARING
FORTHE CHALLENGES OF THE 21 ST CENTURY 261, 263 (Robert D. Reischauer et al. eds., 1998).

83. As a fan of the original Star Trek, you have undoubtedly already noticed the analogies
to "The Trouble with Tribbles." Per your request, Iconfirmed that the screenwriter who forced
William Shatner to utter the line "who put the tribbles in the quadrotriticale?" was on our
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they get, the less credible their efforts to escape the box in which your
eminence has placed them.
The poisoning of legislative politics, which results from the combination
of Democratic lust and Republican anger, ensures that any reforms to Medicare
will not address its fundamental structural flaws. As such, the program remains
on auto-pilot, rather like the Titanic bearing down on an iceberg.14 Of course,
the sinking of the Titanic closed relatively few of our open accounts. The
implosion of the Medicare program and the resulting demoralization costs
imposed on the American republic will add tens of millions to our ranks.
G. Vanity
I close with your favorite sin, vanity.8 5 To some extent, this sin affects
virtually everyone touched by Medicare, but the group whose vanity is most
greatly affected is health policy analysts. 86 Almost without exception, health
policy analysts have hailed the virtues of Medicare and excused its
dysfunctions, reasoning sub silentio that a program offering a rotten benefit
package and mediocre quality health care is better than no program at all.8 7 Of
course, it is no accident that virtually every one of these health policy analysts
is an enthusiastic member of the Democratic Party, for whom the 1960s remain
the best of times.88 Among this group, we actually get a two-for-one effect, as
lust and vanity work together in a synergistic fashion.
payroll.
84. As you know, we had a hand in the sinking of the Titanic-as well as the making of
the resulting movie. Why else would Leonardo DiCaprio end up the star of a major motion
picture? On the other hand, given the overwhelming number of souls we already have optioned
in Hollywood, it was hard to decide among all the "worthy" candidates.
85. See DEVIL'S ADVOCATE (Warner Bros. 1997) (portraying Satan as a New York City

attorney who describes vanity as "definitely my favorite sin").

86. Of course, Congressional vanity comes in second. But on the subject of
Congressional vanity, like the sun rising in the East, what more can be said?
87. As Professor Mark Pauly has noted, Medicare's basic benefit package would not pass
muster with most state insurance commissioners if one tried to offer it. As for the Quality of

care provided Medicare beneficiaries, see infra notes 90-104 and accompanying text
(describing the poor quality of care administered to Medicare beneficiaries). See generally
Hyman, Does Medicare Care About Quality?, supra note 4, at 63-64.
88.

But see CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CITIES 21 (G.F. Maine ed., W.W. Norton

& Co. 1952) (1859) ("It was the best of times, it was the worst of times."). See also Lawrence
D. Brown, Public Health and the Missing Body Politic, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 1997, at 215,
217 (reviewing DAN E. BEAUCHAMP,

HEALTH CARE REFORM AND THE BATTLE FOR THE BODY

"[P]lain people have come to view their democratic populist proponents and protectors
as part of the problem."); Hyman, supra note 15, at 152 ("[G]ood self-help advice should take
POLITIC:
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This vanity takes several distinct forms. One form of vanity is the refusal
of health policy analysts to acknowledge the highly-variable quality of care
provided to Medicare beneficiaries. Normally, policy analysts are stereotypical
"goo-goos," insisting on the dotting of every "I"and the crossing of every "T"
before allowing government money to be spent on anything.8 9 Yet, in
Medicare, the same analysts have bestowed their enthusiasm on a program that
systematically and routinely pays (and frequently overpays!) for the

mistreatment of the vulnerable Americans left in its charge.
Two recent studies offer a useful perspective of our success in these
matters. The first study focused on the quality of care provided to Medicare
beneficiaries on a state-by-state basis.90 The study examined the care provided
to Medicare beneficiaries using twenty-four process-based quality measures
involving the prevention or treatment of six medical conditions.9' The six
medical conditions (acute myocardial infarction, breast cancer, diabetes, heart
failure, pneumonia, and stroke) accounted for a significant amount of morbidity
and mortality in the Medicare beneficiary population. 92 The process-based
measures involved interventions for which there was a strong scientific basis.93
The theoretical goal for each measure was for 100% of qualifying Medicare
beneficiaries to receive the intervention.94 In fact, depending on the measure,
performance rates in the median state ranged from 24% to 99%. Median
advantage of the potential benefits of academic engagement with the real world, while
simultaneously steering its efforts in a direction likely to be useful-with useful defined in light
of the basic insight that the 60s are over").
89. As you know, a "goo-goo" is a "good-government type." We can count on goo-goos
to write long, dull, scolding editorials in the New York Times and Washington Post, bemoaning
the latest excesses of the free market and advocating for more and better regulatory oversight of
whatever offends them. As Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook has noted:
It is ironic that just as a global network and automation are reducing the costs of
contracting, and moving us closer to the world in which the Coase Theorem
prevails, people promote more and more contract-defeating schemes. One is
tempted to think that they are concerned not about market failures but about market
successes-about the prospect that the sort of world people prefer when they vote
their own pocketbooks will depart from the proposers' ideas of what people ought
to prefer. Next thing you know, why, economic transactions between consenting
adults will break out right in public view!
Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace Versus Property Law?, 4 Tax REV. L & POL'Y 103, 111
(1999).
90. Stephen F. Jencks et al., Change In the Quality of Care Delivered to Medicare
Beneficiaries, 1998-1999 to 2000-2001, 289 JAMA 305, 307 (2003).
91. !d.
at 306.
92. Id.
93. Id. at311.
94. Id. at 309.
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performance in the median state was 73%.95 The range of performance rates
also varied widely depending on the measure.96 The study clearly documented
substantial under-provision of necessary care to Medicare beneficiaries.9 7
The second study assessed underuse of necessary care in 345,253
randomly selected Medicare beneficiaries during 1994-1996.98 An expert
panel developed forty indicators of necessary care (including three indicators of
preventive care) and six indicators of avoidable outcomes for fifteen common
acute and chronic medical conditions.99 For sixteen of the forty measures,
beneficiaries received the indicated care less than two-thirds of the time.' °
Beneficiaries received the indicated care 90% of the time for only nine of the
forty measures.' 0 ' For fourteen of the thirty-seven necessary nonpreventive
care indicators, less than two-thirds of beneficiaries received 0 care
that a
2
physician panel considered to meet a minimum quality standard.
These studies confirm that the quality of care received by Medicare
beneficiaries as a group is thoroughly unimpressive. Better yet from our
perspective, this rotten care does not come cheap. The Medicare program has
such inadequate financial controls that it hemorrhages money. Indeed, the
Office of the Inspector General for HHS (OIG) believes roughly 7% of
Medicare payments, totaling approximately $13 billion per year are
"improper.' ' 0 3 Although the General Accounting Office and OIG routinely
issue reports condemning particular financial shenanigans and labeling
Medicare a "high risk program," there has been only limited progress in
bringing fiscal discipline to CMS.' °4
The second form of vanity is the failure of health policy analysts to
appreciate the "sauce for the goose" implications of the precedents they have
Id.
96. Id.
97. Because the study focused on fee-for-service Medicare, it did not include data for the
15% of Medicare beneficiaries covered by Medicare managed care (Medicare Part C). Id. at
310. The measures that were employed also resulted in under-sampling of care provided on an
ambulatory basis and of interventional procedures. Id.
95.

98. Steven M. Asch et al., Measuring Underuse of Necessary Care Among Elderly
Medicare Beneficiaries Using Inpatient and Outpatient Claims, 284 JAMA 2325, 2329 (2000).

99. Id. at 2328-29.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Hyman, HIPAA, supra note 4, at 167 (reporting and critiquing GAO findings that
7% of Medicare spending is attributable to "improper overpayment").
104. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, No. 03-119, HIGH RISK SERIEs: AN
UPDATE (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/pas/2003/d03119.pdf.

MEDICARE MEETS MEPHISTOPHELES

1193

created around the use of Medicare's purchasing power. In most hospitals,
Medicare is the single largest purchaser of health care services. As such, health
policy analysts (consistent with their goo-goo inclinations) have eagerly tied the
acceptance of Medicare money to a variety of our schemes. These schemes
impose ancillary restraints on hospitals that undermine their continued viability
(EMTALA),0 ° condition payment on the satisfaction of every jot and tittle of
the thousands of pages of rules and regulations surrounding Medicare (the
drafting, interpretation and enforcement of which provide steady employment
to the lawyers who have sold their souls to us in exchange for professional
success) or
simply impose substantial administrative burdens for no good result
10 6
(PSDA).
Fortunately (at least from our perspective), the health policy community
never realized that these precedents could be turned on their favorite causes, as
the spending power can be used to bat from both sides of the political plate.
Indeed, federal funding can be used to require private parties to implement
activities that are anathema to health policy analysts, their patrons and
supporters. Conversely, federal funding can be used to require private parties
to terminate activities that are near and dear to the hearts of the same health
policy analysts, their patrons, and supporters. For example, the Solomon
Amendments' 0 7 have been used to force universities and law schools to grant
equal access to the military for recruiting purposes. The False Claims Act,
which requires regulatory compliance with all federal laws, can be used against
institutions whose affirmative action programs do not comply with strict
constitutional requirements, and the billions of dollars at stake will encourage
these institutions to settle on almost any terms. 10 8 The Baby Doe provisions can
be repackaged and redeployed as explicit exercises of the spending power.' °9
105. See supra note 12 (summarizing EMTALA).
106. PSDA is the Patient Self-Determination Act, which requires hospitals that accept
Medicare funding to provide patients with written information concerning their preferences
regarding end-of-life care. It is jarring, to say the least, to check into a hospital for the birth of
one's child and be asked about one's plans regarding such matters.
107. See 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2000) (establishing the funding requirements of the Solomon
Amendments).
108. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2000) (listing the requirements of the False Claims Act).
Compare Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1046 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(declining to use the False Claims Act to enforce regulatory compliance) with United States ex
rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899 (5th Cir. 1997) (allowing
plaintiff to pursue use of the False Claims Act to enforce regulatory compliance).
109. The Baby Doe regulations instructed health care providers that Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act made it unlawful for all hospitals receiving federal financial assistance to

withhold nutrition or medical or surgical treatment from handicapped infants if such treatment

was required to correct a life-threatening condition. The Supreme Court struck down these
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Of course, each change in administration will bring about a dramatic shift in the
substantive obligations imposed on all recipients of federal funds. Over time,
all recipients will be forced to implement some activities inconsistent with their
self-framed missions. This campaign will further our larger agenda of
spreading misery and despair, and will dishearten even the strongest advocates
of Medicare.
The third manifestation of the vanity of health policy analysts is their
enthusiasm for asymmetric arguments. When the Medicare trust fund is
"flush," analysts rebut critics of the program with the observation that Medicare
is on sound fiscal footing. When the projected insolvency date grows closer,
the same analysts rebut critics by claiming that the trust fund is a meaningless
accounting convention and financial projections are inherently unreliable. 0
Another example of this approach involves the "case" for prescription
drug coverage. Many health policy analysts juxtapose the presence of
prescription drug coverage in the private employment-based coverage market
with its absence in Medicare and assume that they have made the case for
program modification. Yet, when critics argue that the private coverage market
has embraced an array of supply-and-demand side restrictions on access to care
and that it might be prudent to reform Medicare in an analogous fashion to
control program costs, health policy analysts routinely respond that changes in
the private market need not be reflected in Medicare. It remains unexplained
why taxpayers should subsidize a system for the elderly that has coverage
features that are more generous than those the taxpayers are willing and able to
buy for themselves. "Sauce for the goose," anyone?
The final form of vanity is the inability of health policy analysts to
perceive the importance of exit and exit rights. In a normal market, vendors
decide whether to deal or not. Refusal to deal sends a useful signal about the
terms that are being offered. Indeed, exit is a critical component of wellfunctioning markets, as resources are diverted from lower- to higher-valued
uses. Yet, in Medicare, health policy analysts treat exit as a mark of disloyalty
(as when Medicare managed care organizations decide to pull out of Part C), or
as an overt attempt to subvert the self-evident virtues of the program (as when
physicians decline to accept new Medicare patients or try to contract with them
separately). The criticisms leveled at "concierge" programs reflect a similar
regulations in Bowen v. American Hospital Association, 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
110. And right they are. Unfortunately, when it comes to Medicare, they turn out to be
unreliable because they are unduly conservative. The original projections for Medicare
dramatically underestimated the actual cost of the program. See EPSTEIN, supra note 33, at 149

(showing a dramatic mismatch between original projections and actual expenditures, despite
testimony at hearings that cost estimates were overly optimistic).
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lack of understanding of the importance of exit rights (as well as of basic
economics).
Admittedly, it is unclear whether the opposition of health policy analysts
to exit rights is attributable to their complete ignorance of economics, their
position as academics (who developed tenure in order to constrain the exercise
of exit rights) or both. It is difficult to determine which effect predominates
because most health policy analysts are academics and most academics are
ignorant of economics. Regardless of where one comes out on this issue, vanity
clearly plays a role in the willingness of health policy analysts to hail
Medicare's "virtues," whitewash its faults, and attack those who do not share
their faith in the "self-evident virtues" of Medicare.
II. Medicareand the UnderminingofAmerican Virtues
As you presciently recognized in your memo proposing Medicare, a
program incorporating the Seven Deadly Sins would never attain its intended
objectives unless we also undermined the American virtues that would
otherwise impede our plans. The two distinctively American virtues that most
directly threatened our plans were thrift and truthfulness. These virtues figured
prominently in the lives of the Founders. Benjamin Franklin celebrated the
importance of thrift in numerous influential writings, and George Washington
was renowned as the politician who could not tell a lie. American politicians
celebrate these virtues, reasoning that they are unelectable if they promise
anything else to their constituents. The near-universality of these virtues in the
American population made it much more difficult for our plans to proceed on
schedule. Thus, we have attacked these virtues on several fronts, using
entitlement programs as our principal weapon.
A. Thrift
DISS is simultaneously submitting a detailed memorandum on the impact
of Social Security on our recruitment efforts and its undermining of the virtue
of thrift, so this memorandum focuses on Medicare. As you know, Medicare's
financing provides that revenues secured from current taxpayers fund the
medical expenses of current beneficiaries, frequently referred to as "pay as you
go.""' Demographic projections and the ever-increasing cost of health care
See Vicki Kemper, Benefits Outlook Is Mixed Bag; Social Security Picture Is
S111.
Brighter, While FutureforMedicare Is Dimmer, Trustees'ReportsShow, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18,

2003, at A20 (describing Medicare's financing structure).
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ensure that the program's economics are simply unsustainable, even without the
addition of a prescription drug benefit. As the summary of the most recent
report from the (ironically named) Trustees of the (also ironically named) Part
A trust fund stated:
[T]he fundamentals of the financial status of Social Security and Medicare
under the intermediate economic and demographic assumptions remain
highly problematic .... Growing deficits will lead to rapidly mounting
pressures on the Federal budget in a decade and exhaustion of trust funds
beginning in little more than two decades .... In the long run, these
deficits are projected to grow at unsustainable rates.' 12
Figure 1, which presents Medicare expenditures as a percentage of GDP,
documents these phenomena graphically. HI stands for hospital insurance (Part
A). SMI stands for Supplemental Medicare Insurance (Part B).
Figure 1
Medicare Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP
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The striking thing about these observations is that they have become
so routine that they are routinely ignored.' 3 Only the imminent
112. Soc. SEC. & MEDICARE BD. OF TRS., A SUMMARY OF THE 2003 ANNUAL REPORTS, at
http://www.ssa/OACT/TRSUM/trsummary.html (2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
113. See Kemper, supra note I 1l, at 20 ("The new numbers are generally followed by
much rhetorical hand-wringing and little political action.").
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"bankruptcy" of the Part A trust fund (less than seven years) is sufficient to
rouse the political process from its sloth.'1 4 The consistent approach when
attempting "reform" is to fix the short term and ignore the (far more
problematic) long term." 5 To be sure, Medicare's short-term financial
prospects are the best they have been in some time, but that is because, as
Figure 2 demonstrates, Medicare has always been on a tenuous financial
footing. Indeed, the Part A trust fund has not been on actuarially sound
footing (such as what would be expected of a private annuity) at any time
since its creation.I16
Figure 2
Number of Years until Part A Trust Fund Insolvency
(Intermediate Projection) 1965-2003
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The extent to which Medicare, with its "promise now, pay later"
approach, has succeeded in undermining the distinctively American virtue
of thrift becomes obvious only by examining the program's long-term
114. See Theodore R. Marmor, How Not to Think About MedicareReform, 26 J. HEALTH,
POL., POL'Y & L. 107, 113-14 (2001) (discussing how the political equivalent of "being hanged
in a fortnight" has the power to concentrate legislative attention on Medicare reform).
115. See Robert M. Ball, The Sky Isn't Fallingon Medicare, L.A. TIMES, July 24,2001, at
B13 (discussing acceptance of short term solutions because of unreliability of long term
projections).
116. To be fair, private pensions need not be fully funded either, but the failure of
companies to fully fund their pensions is routinely criticized by the most enthusiastic supporters
of Medicare. As before, it is hard to have it both ways on this issue-particularly when the
goose has long since drowned in sauce. See 29 U.S.C. § 1082(b) (2000) (establishing the
funding requirements for private pensions).
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projections. Figure 3 shows the present value of the Medicare trust fund
across differing periods, and documents a $5.9 trillion deficit using a
seventy-five year projection.
Figure 3
Present Value of Medicare HI Commitments In
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The Medicare Trustees estimate that this long-term actuarial imbalance
can be corrected by immediately cutting benefits by 42% or increasing the taxes
that fund Medicare by 71% or some combination of both.'" 7 Of course, given
the political dynamics of Medicare, neither of these eventualities will occur.
Indeed, as the current controversy over adding a prescription drug benefit to
Medicare makes clear, all of the pressures are to expand the program, not to
bring its finances into long-term actuarial balance.
To summarize, we are lucky that no one has (so far) "connected the dots"
of the following fundamental features of Medicare:
1. Short-term viability dependent on continuous addition of new
participants/funds;
117.

See Soc. SEC. & MEDICARE BD. OF TRS., supra note 112 (examining the future of

Medicare).
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2.

Unsustainable long-term promises;

3.

Early "investors" paid off with subsequent "investor" contributions;

4. Arguments from security/fidelity/solidarity to ensure continued
participation.
Once these dots are connected, people will realize that Medicare is a
pyramid scheme structured on an intergenerational basis."' Pyramid schemes
are invariably shut down by the authorities as soon as they are discovered on
the grounds that those who were suckered at the outset have no right to share
their misery with others. The legal system imposes harsh penalties on pyramid
scheme organizers because defrauding hundreds or thousands of people is
much worse than defrauding a handful of people. Indeed, if anyone other than
the United States government were running the Medicare program, those
responsible would already be serving long prison terms for fraud. However,
you cleverly positioned Medicare as a sacred intergenerational trust, with the
result that all the political pressures are to preserve, if not expand, the pyramid
scheme.
Despite our repeated efforts to disguise the truth about Medicare through
the endless repetition of misleading rhetoric (principally the phrases "trust
fund" and "lockbox"), many Americans are coming to realize that Medicare is,
in fact, an elaborate intergenerational pyramid scheme. Indeed, no less a "New
Democrat" authority than the New Republic has been forced to observe, "[If
there's a big problem with Medicare these days, it's the program's lack of longterm financial viability."' 19 Thankfully, our framing of the Medicare program
as a sacred intergenerational trust has significantly dampened the outrage that
would otherwise result; the New Republic would not have been nearly as
complacent had the sentence been: "If there's a big problem with Enron these
days, it's the company's lack of long-term financial viability." Of course, the
principal difference between Medicare and Enron is that Medicare's
"lack of
20
long-term financial viability" is much worse than Enron's.
118.

See generally JAMES WALSH,- YOU CAN'T CHEAT AN HONEST MAN: How PONZI
FRAUDS WORK... AND WHY THEY'RE MORE COMMON THAN EVER
(1988); Peter J. Vander Nat & William W. Keep, Marketing Fraud: An Approach for
Differentiating Multilevel Marketing from Pyramid Schemes, 21 J. PuB. POL'Y & MARKETING
SCHEMES AND PYRAMID

139 (Spring 2002).
119.

Jonathan Cohn, The Single Guy, NEW REPUBUC ONLINE

12, Nov. 22, 2002, at

http://www/tnr.con/ doc.mhtml?i=express/sc--cohn 112202 (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). Normally, this defect would be dispositive, but self-styled sacred
intergenerational trusts are apparently subject to different rules.
120. As Figure 3 documents, the present value of Medicare's unfunded liabilities inPart A

1200

60 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1165 (2003)

Although we have largely stifled the criticisms that pyramid schemes
usually engender, we must expect the Medicare program (and its financing) to
come under increasing scrutiny in the coming years. We have already
contacted our affiliates on K Street and at various think tanks, who stand ready
to defend the "virtue" of the Medicare program from its all-too-correct critics.
The good news is that our efforts at destroying public education in the United
States (along with our systematic resistance to vouchers) has rendered a large
chunk of the population functionally innumerate.' 21 The impassioned defenses
of Medicare offered by most health policy analysts 22 will accordingly be
resolved at the
level of rhetoric, instead of through simple addition and
23
subtraction.
Our success using entitlement programs to undermine thrift has benefited
from our separate initiative discouraging the repayment of debts, which has
borne fruit in the tax law. The tax code only allows the deduction of "ordinary
and necessary" business expenses. 24 In an influential opinion, the Supreme
Court ruled that post-discharge repayment of debt was nondeductible because
such conduct was not "ordinary and necessary."' 125 Of course, if Americans
over the next seventy-five years is approximately $6 trillion. If one includes the projected
expenditures attributable to government payment of the majority of Part B expenditures and
does not impose an arbitrary seventy-five year cap, the figure is substantially larger. See
JAGADEESH GOKHALE & KENT SMETTERS, FISCAL AND GENERATIONAL IMBALANCES:

NEW

BUDGET MEASURES FOR NEW BUDGET PRIORITIEs 3-4 (2003) (noting that the fiscal imbalance of
Medicare totals $36.6 trillion out of a total federal fiscal imbalance of $44.2 trillion and that
fixing it will require additional annual payroll taxes of 16.6%, a 66% increase, beginning
immediately), availableat http://www.aei.org/publications/bookID.426,filter./bookdetail.asp.
At the time of its bankruptcy filing, Enron claimed liabilities of $27 billion and assets of
$61 billion. Even if one (implausibly) assumes that Enron had no assets whatsoever, its
liabilities are only 0.3% of Medicare's unfunded liabilities in Part A. Yet, the New Republic has
been the scourge of all those associated with Enron (no matter how distantly), even as it
suggests that we should reconfigure the nation's health care along the lines of Medicare. Go
figure (or not, if you are a lawyer). See supranote 12 (discussing the subpar math skills of the

average lawyer).
12 1. Lawyers do not count, because they are innumerate to begin with. See supra note 12
(lambasting the average lawyer's math skills).
122. See supra Part II.G (discussing vanity of health policy analysts and their unflinching
defense of Medicare).
123. Of course, as every political campaign involving Medicare illustrates, "Figures don't
lie, but liars figure."
124. See I.R.C. § 162 (2002) ("There shall be allowed as adeduction all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business .... ).
125. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933) (stating that the repayment of debts
previously discharged in bankruptcy was not deductible because it was not ordinary and
necessary). Welch and his father owned agrain brokerage business in Minnesota, which went
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retained their traditional virtues such behavior would have been not only
"ordinary and necessary," but appropriate, if not essential. Yet, Justice
Cardozo's opinion made repayment of debt less likely, reinforcing lax attitudes
rewarding indebtedness.
B. Truthfulness
As you predicted, entitlement programs have provided numerous
opportunities for political dissembling. As noted previously, the ceaseless
use of misleading terminology (for example, trust-fund and lock-box) is
one aspect of the phenomenon. This terminology is used to suggest that
Medicare administrators "save" contributions even though the
administrators spend all the money as soon as they receive it or loan it to
the Treasury in exchange for a commitment that is binding on future
taxpayers. So much for the purported superior ability of government to
126
balance the interests of future generations against current voters!
Politicians display a similarly flexible acquaintance with the truth when
they assert that beneficiaries deserve enhanced benefits (such as a
prescription drug benefit) simply because, at some time in the past, they
paid some amount into the system. Such strategies are an invitation to
disaster. Indeed, pyramid schemes self-destruct precisely because everyone
takes out of the pot more than they put in.
The full effect of Medicare on political truthfulness is demonstrated by
the whoppers politicians will tell to justify their attempts to "save" the
program from self-destruction or to extract political advantage from the
"reform" proposals of their opponents. Both Republicans and Democrats
know they are unelectable if they speak candidly about the economic
problems facing Medicare. Republicans accordingly package their reform
proposals as attempts to "modernize" the Medicare benefit package and
offer beneficiaries more options. Democrats focus their efforts on price
caps and prayer. Neither approach is likely to produce even the minimum

bankrupt in 1922. Id. at 112. Welch talked to three Minneapolis bankers who told him, if he
ever wanted to be accepted by the business community again, he would have to repay his
discharged debts. Id. Welch repaid his debts, but his attempts to deduct the repayments were
turned away by Justice Cardozo, who reasoned that repayment was not "ordinary and
necessary." Id. at 115. Justice Cardozo failed to consider that his conclusion would undermine
the likelihood of further repayments-making them even less ordinary, let alone necessary.

126. See supra note 56 (expressing skepticism that the political system will safeguard the
interests of future voters, let alone nonvoters).
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expected of a private insurance plan or investment-actuarially sound and
economically sustainable promises to purchasers/investors.
Consider a concrete example. As you know, Medicare has two parts:
Part A, which is paid for with payroll contributions, and Part B, which is
paid for with general revenues and beneficiary contributions. Part A has
been subject to periodic crises, as the Medicare trustees dutifully announce
that the Part A trust fund will go bankrupt in a few years. There are only
two possible strategies to address this problem: increase the flow of
revenues into the Part A trust fund or decrease the flow of payments out of
the Part A trust fund. Part B provides a seeming "third way"-shifting
costs from Part A to Part B. This approach appears to solve the problem
but actually makes it worse by hiding the severity of the problem and
suggesting that Medicare's problems can be addressed through sleight of
hand.
One recent use of this strategy exemplifies the opportunities for
mischief. In 1997, the Clinton Administration announced a plan to "save"
Medicare. The plan included a broad array of statutory and regulatory
changes, the most significant (and least noticed) of which was to transfer
home health care from Part A to Part B. 12 For most people, an expenditure
is an expenditure, regardless of where the money comes from. Budgeting
in the government works differently. Moving home health care out of Part
A "saved" Medicare almost $100 billion and extended the life of the trust
fund even though the budget absorbed the same cost elsewhere and the
exact same amounts still had to be paid. '28 When asked about this strategy,
HHS Secretary Donna Shalala replied that the change was appropriate
29
because it was consistent with the original structural design of Medicare.
127. See George Rodrigue, LargestSaving Would Be $100 Billionfrom Medicare;Clinton
Says the Vulnerable Will Be Protected, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Feb. 7, 1997, at IA ("Mr.
Clinton reached his Medicare savings target partly by shifting about $85 billion in home healthcare costs from Medicare's Part A trust fund-which faces bankruptcy-to its Part B program
which is funded mostly by general tax revenues").
128. It is unfortunate that Max Bialystock was unable to exploit similar accounting rules,
but at least his travails have resulted in a popular movie and Broadway show that allowed us to
reposition the Third Reich in a more favorable light. MEL BROOKS, Ti PRODUCERS (2002)
("Don't be stupid/be a smarty/come and join the Nazi party.").
129. See Dan Freedman, Home Health Care Is Focus of Medicare Battle, SUN-SENTINEL
(Fla.), Feb. 16, 1997, at 3A ("Shalala argued that the plan conforms to the original intent of the
1965 law establishing Medicare: Let the trust fund take care of major hospital expenses and
have the supplementary insurance program cover everything else."). In theory, one could keep
this strategy up indefinitely and maintain the trust fund in surplus simply by transferring out
expenses that can no longer be covered by Part A contributions. This "wishing makes it so"
approach to program expenditures hides and, by deferring, increases the severity of Medicare's
fiscal crisis.
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As you know, the road to hell is a superhighway paved with such
stratagems and justifications.
Such behavior is, of course, bipartisan. We fully expect that the
debate in the 108th Congress over creating a Medicare prescription drug
benefit will provide us with numerous additional examples of such conduct
and rhetoric. Unfortunately, your deadline for submission of this memo
precludes me from including what we at DISS fully expect to be the
pinnacle of partisan political rhetoric.
IV Conclusion
All of the building blocks are in place for our plans to destabilize the virtue of
the American republic. Although actuarial estimates vary somewhat (regrettably,
we have not succeeded in suboming all the actuaries), the Medicare budget is
heading for a demographic brick wall at an accelerating rate. Every attempt to
impose fiscal discipline triggers squeals of outrage from affected providers,
beneficiary groups and true believers in the intergenerational pyramid scheme. To
date we have forestalled every attempt to comprehensively reform Medicare and we
are confident that we will be able to do so in the 108th Congress.
Our best calculation is that the Medicare program will completely implode
within two generations. Efforts to "reform" Medicare will extend the process only
slightly, while simultaneously breeding dissension and class warfare-confirming
the predictions outlined in your original memo.'" ° As long as no one learns of our
plans, we look forward to an ever-increasing United States market share. Best of all,
we obtain this increase in market share without any further promotional/recruiting
expenditures on our part. You have replaced the virtuous circle at the heart of the
American republic with a vicious circle.' All of us in the North American division
of DISS bow our horns in awe of your subtle genius.
Have a hellish day.
130.

See SATAN, supra note 20, at 666 (detailing scheme to subvert American virtues).
See ROBERT D. PUTNAM ET AL., MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: Civic TRADITIONS IN
MODERN ITALY 177 (1993) (discussing markers of civic virtue in modem American society).
Putnam wrote:
Stocks of social capital, such as trust, norms, and networks, tend to be selfreinforcing and cumulative. Virtuous circles result in social equilibria with high
levels of cooperation, trust, reciprocity, civic engagement, and collective wellbeing .... Conversely, the absence of these traits in the uncivic community is also
self-reinforcing. Defection, distrust, shirking, exploitation, isolation, disorder, and
stagnation intensify one another in a suffocating miasma of vicious circles.
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Underling Demon 666
DASCAR, DISS
Post-Script:
Of course, it is libelous to suggest that the most successful program of
Johnson's Great Society is a demonic plot. However, satire provides a tool for
exploring some of Medicare's problems in a less confrontational manner than would
otherwise be the case. At least that's my story and I'm sticking to it.
To be sure, many of Medicare's defenders react to even the slightest criticism
of their program with a ferocity that demonstrates that their enthusiasm has more to
do with ideology than the actuarially sound/goo-goo approach they would insist
on if we were talking about anything other than Medicare. Imagine the cries of
righteous indignation that we would hear from Medicare's defenders if
Congress established a program with similar spending projections and
unimpressive quality to secure weapons for the military instead of health care
for the elderly.
Satire has the potential to provoke the program's defenders to at least start
to acknowledge some of Medicare's problems. Of course, it would be foolish
to be overly optimistic about how much Medicare's defenders are likely to
acknowledge. Indeed, it is likely that Medicare's defenders will get stuck at
either stage 1 (denial) or stage 2 (anger), instead of progressing to bargaining
(stage 3) or depression (stage 4)-let alone acceptance (stage 5).132
Consider what happened when I presented some (considerably less
pointed) remarks on Medicare at the conference at the Washington & Lee
University School of Law. One of Medicare's most enthusiastic supporters
responded by making an impassioned speech that it was improper to describe
Medicare as a "Ponzi scheme," and the program should not be judged by the
standards that would apply to a private pension because it was actually a
"sacred bond" between the generations. 33 His words brought enthusiastic
applause from those members of the audience who had heard enough bad news
and were more than ready to ignore Medicare's problems on the basis of
political sloganeering. Yet, this "explanation" provides no basis for believing
that Medicare should not be judged by the standards of any other government
expenditure or private investment, let alone a defensible theory for
132. See ELIZABETH S. KOBLER-Ross, ON DEATH & DYING 34-121 (MacMillen Co., 7th
prtg. 1971) (1969) (discussing the five stages of grief).

133. 1never used the word "Ponzi" inmy remarks. I did note that the Medicare program
bore certain similarities to an intergenerational pyramid scheme. Of course, it is possible that
the use of this term was simply a Freudian slip by a Medicare enthusiast who can't handle the
truth. See A FEW GOOD MEN (Columbia Tri Star 1992) ("You can't handle the truth!").
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understanding how any given act of Congress magically becomes a "sacred
bond between the generations." Instead, this "explanation" is, at best, nothing
more than an exercise in sophistry and, at worst, simply another example of the
"wishing makes it so" approach to 1Medicare
that is pathonemonic of the
34
program's more vehement defenders.
If Medicare really were a sacred bond between the generations, Medicare
reform would not be a live issue on the political agenda, which it is. There
would not have been a bipartisan Commission on Medicare reform, which there
was.' 35 The bipartisan Commission would not have considered moving the
program from a defined benefit to a defined contribution approach, which it
did. 36 There certainly would not have been a clear majority (albeit not a supermajority) for this approach, which there was.' 37 Stated simply, Medicare
reform is a live issue because Medicare is not a sacred bond between the
generations. It's just a program and a pretty mediocre one at that.
The depth and sincerity of Medicare defenders' faith in the program (and
in centralized command-and-control administered pricing systems more
generally) should not obscure the reality that Medicare's philosophical
foundations are contested and up for reconsideration to a degree not seen since
the program's enactment. Given this scrutiny, it is worth considering how
Medicare fares in light of the parable that Milton Friedman told when he was
honored for his lifetime achievement at the White House on May 9, 2002:
My views on government spending can be summarized by the following
parable. If you spend your own money on yourself, you are very concerned
about how much is spent and how it is spent. If you spend your own money
on someone else, you are still very much concerned about how much is
spent, but somewhat less concerned about how it is spent. If you spend
someone else's money on yourself, you are not too concerned about how
much is spent, but you are very concerned about how it is spent. However,
if you spend someone else's money on someone else,3you are not very
concerned about how much is spent or how it is spent.

134.

See Ball, supra note 115, at B1 3 (suggesting that dismal long-term projections for

Medicare should be ignored because beneficiaries need help with prescription drug coverage

now, and the future will take care of itself).
135. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 347 (establishing the
National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare).
136. See National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare, Transcript of
Commission Meeting (Mar. 16, 1999), at http://medicare.commission.gov/medicare/trans.html
(outlining defined contribution strategy for reforming Medicare) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
137. Id.
138. Milton Friedman, Remarks at White House Ceremony in his Honor (May 9, 2002), in
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Three guesses as to which of the four formulations best describes
Medicare-although the answer does depend on one's position on the political
spectrum and on whether one is currently a Medicare beneficiary or provider of
services to the same. Of course, it is possible that Friedman's insight has
nothing to do with the debate over Medicare and the preferences of Medicare's
supporters. 39 It is also possible that the moon is made of green cheese. To be
sure, literature provides a complementary explanation for the refusal of
Medicare's proponents to face actuarial reality. As Saul Bellow once noted: "A
great deal of intelligence
can be invested in ignorance when the need for
140
illusion is deep."'
Another issue is whether the observations in the DISS memorandum are
falsified or confirmed by the passage of the Medicare Prescription and
Modernization Act of 2003 (the Act). As any fair minded reader must
acknowledge, six of the seven deadly sins (avarice, gluttony, envy, lust, anger,
and vanity) were on full display during legislative deliberations, and there is no
question that the Act reflects the influences of each and every one of them. 14 '
Sloth is the only one of the seven deadly sins that appears to be inconsistent
with the Act-but there was legislative sloth in addressing Medicare's
budgetary prospects. Indeed, if anything, the Act actually worsened Medicare's
long-term financial outlook. Unfortunately, there has been no further
communication from DISS, so it is impossible to say what Underling Demon
666 (let alone the Devil) make of the Act. Stay tuned for further developments.
Finally, during the symposium, Professor Oberlander accurately described
Medicare as a flower-child-to which I retorted that it was the only flowerchild I was aware of with $250 billion per year with which to fix prices and
interfere with the functioning of the market for health care services. A more
devastating come-back escaped me at the time, but occurred to me later. In the
immortal words
of Dr. Evil, "There's nothing more pathetic than an aging
42
hipster."

July/Aug. 2002, at 11,
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/policyreport/v24n4/cpr-24n4.pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). President
Bush's remarks on the occasion may be found at http:/www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases
/2002/05/20020509- I .html (May 9, 2002) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
139. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (noting common belief in progressive
circles that the highest purpose of government is to send people checks in the mail).
140. Quotation attributed to Saul Bellow, http://www.quotemeonit.com/bellow.html (last
visited Jan. 22, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
141. Somewhat surprisingly, many Republicans and Democrats switched deadly sins
during the course of the debate.
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AuSTfN POWERS: INTERNATIONAL MAN OF MYSTERY (New Line Cinema

1997).

